Int'l Tax News

This article analyzes the administration’s response to the Supreme Court’s ruling striking down core elements of its tariff program. Despite the legal setback, the president signals an intent to maintain aggressive trade measures through alternative mechanisms. The piece evaluates the economic rationale behind the administration’s trade strategy, the legal constraints imposed by the Court’s decision, and the potential consequences for global supply chains and U.S. trading partners.

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This article focuses on the European response to the Supreme Court’s decision invalidating portions of the U.S. tariff regime. European officials had anticipated stabilization in transatlantic trade relations, but the ruling introduces new uncertainty regarding future U.S. trade policy. The piece examines the broader implications for EU–U.S. economic coordination, trade negotiations, and geopolitical dynamics amid ongoing tensions with China and other major economies.

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This article analyzes the global impact of President Trump’s newly announced flat-rate tariff following the Supreme Court ruling on earlier levies. It examines how major trading partners—including China, Brazil, the EU and Japan—may be differentially affected, highlighting cross-border trade flows, retaliatory risks, and the broader implications for international economic alignment and global supply chains.

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Senior US officials said President Donald Trump’s tariff defeat at the Supreme Court won’t unravel deals negotiated with US partners as they sought to defend the administration’s assertive trade policies.

In a swift reversal of fortunes, countries that had been hardest hit by US President Donald Trump’s tariffs have emerged as the biggest winners from the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down his emergency levies.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent dodged questions about refunds after the Supreme Court struck the vast majority of President Trump’s tariffs down.

This article examines the international fallout from the Supreme Court’s decision invalidating key components of President Trump’s tariff program. The ruling raises significant uncertainty for bilateral and regional trade agreements negotiated under tariff pressure, including arrangements with major U.S. trading partners. The piece analyzes how governments and firms may reassess commitments made in response to threatened or imposed tariffs, and considers the broader implications for trade diplomacy and cross-border economic stability.

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Following the Supreme Court’s rejection of the administration’s use of emergency powers to impose sweeping tariffs, this article explores the alternative statutory authorities available to the executive branch. It outlines the legal frameworks under U.S. trade law—including national security and unfair trade practice provisions—that may serve as the basis for continued tariff actions. The piece situates the ruling within the broader separation-of-powers debate and highlights the ongoing legal and economic uncertainty facing international trade partners.

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The Supreme Court’s ruling that struck down the sweeping global tariffs at the heart of President Trump’s economic policies has produced enormous cracks in the GOP’s outward show of party unity.

Millionaire investor Kevin O’Leary warned of a “major compliance cost” for business owners in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling that blocks President Trump from using emergency powers to impose sweeping tariffs.

Following the Supreme Court’s decision striking down President Trump’s use of emergency powers to impose global tariffs, companies are scrambling to determine whether they can recover billions in paid duties and how to respond to the administration’s newly announced 10% global tariff under a different legal authority. The article examines the legal uncertainty surrounding tariff authority and the practical consequences for multinational businesses and trade flows.

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The Supreme Court’s decision to nullify a large swath of the Trump administration’s tariffs cleared the way for companies to seek refunds of tariffs already paid, which could come with a slew of transfer pricing issues for them to navigate.

President Donald Trump can lean on alternative legislation to try to rebuild his tariff wall, after the US Supreme Court ruled that he can’t use a 1977 emergency law to impose import taxes.

President Donald Trump imposed a 10% global tariff on foreign goods, moving quickly to preserve his trade agenda after the US Supreme Court struck down many of the levies he imposed last year.

The OECD launched new tools and frequently asked questions for the simplified transfer pricing method known as Amount B, as countries around the world ponder whether the new method is a good fit for them.

Italian practitioners expect pillar 2 to generate limited new revenue in higher-tax jurisdictions like Italy, viewing it primarily as a structural backstop against low-tax outcomes rather than a revenue raiser. Commentary highlights compliance burdens, including duplication between GloBE reporting and domestic filings, complex jurisdiction-level ETR calculations, and M&A complications. The OECD’s side-by-side safe harbor is not expected to materially reduce obligations for Italian subsidiaries of U.S.-parented groups because domestic top-up and reporting requirements remain.

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Singapore projects increased corporate tax revenue from the fiscal year 2027 as it implements the OECD pillar 2 regime through an MNE top-up tax and a domestic top-up tax. Officials emphasized that while the 15% minimum rate will boost collections, Singapore must expand targeted incentives to remain competitive in a reshoring environment. The 2026 budget pairs minimum-tax compliance with measures such as a 40% corporate income tax rebate and enhanced internationalization and innovation incentives.

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Poland is consulting on a proposed 3% digital services tax targeting large multinationals with significant global and Polish revenue thresholds. Stakeholders raised concerns about competitiveness, administrative complexity, enforceability, and possible U.S. retaliation, while the finance ministry reportedly remains cautious about alignment with international tax commitments. Inclusion in the government’s legislative agenda will determine whether the DST advances toward parliamentary debate in 2026.

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A United Nations committee will form a task force to look at why developing nations can’t access transfer pricing databases, after hearing support for the move from a large group of countries as part of negotiations for a new UN tax treaty.

The authors argue the U.S. refusal to restore a functioning WTO appellate system amid DST disputes is a rational response to asymmetric litigation risk, not hypocrisy. They contend that any U.S. challenge to foreign DSTs could invite counterclaims targeting U.S. tax provisions such as FDII and IC-DISC as prohibited export subsidies, which are easier to attack under WTO doctrine than DSTs. The piece frames DST conflict as a structural tax-trade mismatch, in which U.S. corporate tax incentives may be more legally vulnerable than the DSTs the United States opposes.

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The OECD’s Forum on Harmful Tax Practices released updated peer review findings under BEPS Action 5, assessing preferential regimes and substantial activity requirements. Ireland and Peru were found not to have harmful regimes, while Fiji abolished two incentive regimes, and Anguilla and the Turks and Caicos Islands were flagged for follow-up. The report reflects ongoing multilateral monitoring and pressure to align domestic regimes with substance and transparency standards.

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PwC told Dutch lawmakers that the pillar 2 “side-by-side” safe harbor could prompt multinationals to shift their headquarters, R&D, or other high-value functions out of the Netherlands, thereby threatening the corporate tax base. It urged policymakers to consider competitiveness responses, such as lowering the corporate rate, redesigning innovation box incentives to align with the substance-based safe harbor, or using Article 11 of the EU Pillar 2 directive to opt out of the domestic top-up tax. The warning reflects broader EU tensions between minimum-tax coordination and national competitiveness strategies, as pillar 2 begins to influence location decisions.

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Senate Democrats introduced the Stop Corporate Inversions Act to restrict further transactions that move a company’s tax residence abroad through acquisitions of smaller foreign corporations. The proposal signals renewed appetite to tighten the inversion rules and reinforce §7874-style constraints as part of a broader anti-base-erosion agenda. If enacted, it could narrow viable outbound restructuring paths and increase the tax friction of cross-border M&A involving U.S.-parented groups.

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Rep. Moran’s proposal would deny major federal business tax incentives to companies that use technology controlled by foreign entities of concern, tying tax eligibility to national security and data-risk considerations. The bill would effectively convert credits and incentives into a compliance lever for supply chain and technology governance, potentially affecting planning in manufacturing and tech-heavy sectors. It reflects a broader trend of using tax policy to advance geopolitical and cybersecurity goals, adding another layer of constraints to incentive-driven investment decisions.

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This opinion piece by the former chairman of the House Ways & Means committee discusses the administration’s agreement advancing a new global minimum tax framework aimed at reducing double taxation across jurisdictions. The article situates the proposal within broader OECD-led efforts to coordinate corporate tax rules and reallocate taxing rights internationally. It highlights ongoing political and policy debates surrounding implementation and sovereignty concerns. For international tax practitioners, the piece reflects the continuing evolution of multilateral tax coordination and the policy tensions surrounding global minimum tax enforcement.

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Countries with large tax treaty networks said that a prospective United Nations tax agreement on cross-border services would see far less uptake if it required an automatic override of existing treaties.

Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra said pillar 2 has “deteriorated” and pillar 1 remains stalled, but he is not ready to push an EU-wide digital services tax and wants to exhaust options to preserve the two-pillar project. He argued that an EU DST would be politically and technically difficult because DST countries would push their existing models, while other member states would demand trade-offs. Hoekstra also defended the Commission’s 2026 withdrawal of several stalled tax proposals (including DEBRA, Unshell, and a transfer pricing directive) while keeping older DST and “significant digital presence” proposals available as leverage.

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Europe’s businesses and tax advisers are calling on the European Commission to repeal reporting requirements for cross-border tax planning across the bloc.

Developed and developing economies negotiating a new United Nations tax treaty proposed competing visions for how the agreement should allocate taxing powers over cross-border services.

The OECD is working with a number of countries to implement a simplified transfer pricing method broadly agreed to in 2021—even as questions continue to swirl about which, if any, countries beyond the US and Singapore will actually adopt it. The organization has been helping developing nations, in particular, assess the impact that adopting the method, known as Amount B, would have on their tax bases, and is working with countries that have decided to implement it, OECD senior transfer pricing adviser Mayra Lucas said.

The OECD is working on possibly expanding the types of tax adjustments that should be subject to mutual agreement procedures in the organization’s model treaty, an official said.

Every option should be exhausted to salvage an OECD project that would reallocate profits of large multinational companies to countries where their sales are made, a top EU official said.

Some big US-based multinationals are paying more in taxes to other countries than to their own, fueling questions about whether companies are shifting profits abroad to cut their tax bills.

The OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting side-by-side package marks a significant evolution of the global minimum tax regime. The package substantially revises the treatment of tax incentives under the global minimum tax. Although developed at the request of the US, its implications extend well beyond.

African nations face a continued risk of losing revenue to developed countries that apply the global minimum tax despite redesigned rules that feature a carve-out for US multinational companies, a group of the continent’s countries argued.

A large swath of countries pushed back against a proposal that the United Nations play a role in encouraging the exchange of tax information between nations over concerns the move would impose obligations on governments.

The article explains the debate over new U.N. Model article 12AA, which would let countries impose gross withholding tax on cross border services even without a permanent establishment. It cites an ICC commissioned Oxford Economics report warning the rule could reduce services trade and investment and ultimately lower developing country revenues, while supporters say it is a simpler way to expand source country taxing rights in a digital economy. For practitioners, the key issues will be how countries define covered services, set rate caps, coordinate credits, and handle disputes if 12AA is adopted.

To read the document, it be can be read here.

ATAF’s analysis of the Inclusive Framework’s “side-by-side” package argues that the revisions still leave African countries vulnerable to losing residence-based taxing rights under pillar 2. It stresses that without QDMTTs and incentive reform, locally earned income can be absorbed by other countries through the IIR/UTPR or through new side-by-side outcomes. ATAF supports monitoring features but warns that broadened safe harbors and favorable treatment for certain incentives could erode domestic revenue and undermine tax sovereignty goals. 

For more information, see here. 

The IRS’s final regulations for foreign tax credits for digital taxes cast a broader net than just addressing treatment—they may prevent taxpayers from obtaining foreign tax credits because of artificial intelligence, which enables intellectual property to migrate seamlessly across borders.

A growing number of foreign multinationals are exploring whether to relocate their parent companies to the US, with interest spurred in recent weeks by a deal struck at the OECD exempting American businesses from key parts of the 15% global minimum tax.

Three large banks, Banco Citibank SA, Itaú Unibanco, and Banco Santander Brasil, reportedly paid about BRL 2.4 billion, around $457 million, to settle Brazilian tax disputes, with average discounts of about 21 percent on interest and penalties. The settlements reportedly covered disputes involving Brazil’s former financial transactions tax for Santander and Citibank, and PIS and COFINS-style social contributions plus income tax and the social contribution on net profit for Itaú. The piece shows how Brazil uses settlement programs to close contentious assessments by discounting add-ons such as interest and penalties, and it underscores the real cash costs and compliance risks multinationals face in Brazil’s financial sector.

To read the document, it be can be read here.

Semer argues that the Treasury’s December 15, 2025, final and proposed section 892 regulations would significantly restrict how foreign sovereign investors can invest in the United States while keeping the section 892 exemption. He says the rules could treat routine lending and credit activity, and even standard minority protection governance rights, as disqualifying commercial activity or effective control. The result, he argues, is a policy contradiction where rules meant to police abuse could make sovereign capital harder and more expensive to attract, forcing funds and deal parties to rethink loan terms, veto rights, and compliance planning under section 892.

To read the document, it be can be read here.

An EU Commission official says member states are divided on cross-border remote work, and businesses warn that unclear tax rules are changing hiring and investment decisions across the single market. Companies cite permanent establishment and broader corporate tax exposure as the main problem, with some limiting remote work or hiring to avoid creating nexus through employee presence. The piece frames this as a live administration challenge at the intersection of PE standards, corporate residence, and withholding and payroll compliance, with implications for the EU’s simplification and competitiveness agenda. 

To read the document, it be can be read here.

A global business group said that developing countries would lose hundreds of millions of dollars a year if they adopt a new method of taxing cross-border services endorsed by the United Nations. The International Chamber of Commerce said a report (read the report here) it commissioned found the UN Model Tax Convention’s Article 12AA would lower annual revenue in developing countries by $241 million.

Two Dutch tax practitioners say the Netherlands should apply for the OECD Pillar Two side by side safe harbor, arguing its system is already closed because of the 25.8 percent corporate rate, a domestic top up tax, and strong antiavoidance rules. They frame it as a competitiveness and compliance burden move, warning the Netherlands could face maximum hassle and minimum revenue if it implements Pillar Two without safe harbor protection, especially after the Inclusive Framework’s January 5 deal shielding U.S. groups from IIR and UTPR. They also stress timing, noting the OECD will review regimes on request by the end of the first half of 2026, while Dutch politics have not clearly committed to applying despite parliamentary pressure and potential state aid concerns.

To read the document, it be can be read here.

The OECD’s new “side-by-side” deal exempts US-headquartered multinationals from much of its global minimum tax rules. The UK government has announced that it will implement this deal through new domestic legislation (retroactive to Jan. 1). The EU plans to implement it as well, likely through treating the new safe harbor as consistent with existing exemptions rather than trying to amend the Pillar Two directive that created the minimum tax regime.

More than a half-dozen countries said negotiations over a future United Nations tax treaty need to quickly clarify how the agreement will affect exiting tax treaties as delegates began a new round of talks.

Sheppard argues the OECD’s “side-by-side” safe harbor is an imperfect near-term fix for U.S. multinationals because it does not eliminate QDMTT exposure and may not meaningfully reduce ongoing Pillar 2 compliance. Until countries actually enact and implement the law, U.S. groups may still need to book and compute current IIR/UTPR exposure for financial reporting purposes. The piece also flags structural frictions, including the lack of a QDMTT “push-down” and continued reliance on complex book-income adjustments and elections, suggesting the safe harbors are a band-aid on a flawed framework. 

To read the document, it be can be read here.

Herzfeld argues that even as governments negotiate formal fixes like the Pillar 2 side-by-side safe harbor, many multinationals face opaque foreign audit practices that operate more like “pay-to-play” pressure than predictable rule-of-law enforcement. Herzfeld critiques OECD peer reviews for failing to identify real barriers to MAP and highlights the need for tougher enforcement and penalty tools in jurisdictions such as France, Italy, Mexico, and Australia. Herzfeld suggests responses including enhanced U.S. disclosure of foreign audit activity and a more reality-based peer review that incorporates taxpayer experience. 

To read the document, it be can be read here.

The European Commission opened infringement proceedings against 14 EU member states for failing to fully transpose DAC8 (cryptoasset tax transparency) and/or DAC9 (pillar 2 reporting) by the December 31, 2025 deadline. The action underscores the EU’s growing emphasis on enforcement of tax transparency and global minimum tax reporting as core elements of its anti–tax avoidance agenda. The article focuses on uneven national implementation of pillar 2–related obligations, with potential escalation to the Court of Justice if member states do not respond satisfactorily.

To read the document, it be can be read here.